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Abstract:  
We analyze the effects of the financial crisis in credit valuation adjustments (CVA's). 
Following the arbitrage-free valuation framework presented in Brigo et al. (2009), we 
consider a model with stochastic Gaussian interest rates and CIR++ default intensities. 
Departing from previous literature, we are able to calibrate default intensities profiting 
from Gaussian mapping techniques presented in Brigo and Alfonsi (2004), and 
reproduce the historically observed instantaneous covariances of CDS prices. To test the 
calibration procedure, we track the Spanish financial sector, who has behaved in a 
singular manner through the crisis, regarded among the safest in Europe at the 
beginning, and in need of a partial bailout a few years later. We calculate adjustments 
involving the two major Spanish banks and a generic European counterpart in these two 
situations for both interest rate and credit derivatives. 
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En este trabajo se analizan los efectos de la crisis financiera en los ajustes por 
valoración de riesgo de crédito. Siguiendo el marco de valoración libre de riesgo 
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1 Introduction
1.1 Context
The financial crisis that started in 2007 has caused a paradigm shift in the business of banking.
Every stakeholder in the industry, from regulators to investment banks, from rating agencies to
hedge funds, has been obliged to make a halt and reconsider the very basics of their daily tasks.
In a similar fashion to the stock market crash of October 1987, when the volatility smile first
appeared in equity option prices1, this crisis is challenging traditional financial engineering in
several ways. Typical non arbitrage relationships between spot and forward interest rates do not
hold anymore due to the appearance of basis spreads among tenors. Interest rates are entering
negativeness for certain products. Traditional safe assets, such as OECD sovereign bonds, are
becoming dubious when not dangerously risky.
Another area in need of revision is the treatment of Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) in market
activities, that is, the risk that the counterparty defaults before the final settlement of a transaction’s
cash flows. If the portfolio has a positive value for the bank at the time of default, an economic
loss will occur. Notice that CCR has a bilateral nature in derivatives, since the market value of
the portfolio can be positive or negative depending on time-varying market factors. In this setup,
Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) is the difference between the risk-free portfolio value and the
true portfolio value that takes into account the counterparty’s default. In short, CVA is the market
value of CCR.
The review on CCR has been threefold. Previously addressed under International Accounting
Standards (IAS) 39, its importance was further stressed in January 2013, when the International
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 13 ”Fair Value Measurement” entered into force. Largely
based on the accounting standard applied in the United States, it intends to harmonize the definition
of fair value, which is characterized as an exit price, that is, the one that would be received or paid
in an orderly transaction between market participants. In this context, CCR plays a major role in
the computation of fair value.
1See, for example, [Hull]
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From a regulatory perspective, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recognized in
2009 that capital for CCR had proved to be inadequate. The then ongoing regulatory framework,
Basel II, addressed CCR as a default and credit migration risk, not fully accounting for market
value losses short of default. However, as the Basel Committee pointed, ”roughly two-thirds
of CCR losses were due to CVA losses and only about one-third were due to actual defaults”.
The identification of this and other related shortcomings led to a comprehensive reform on the
calculation of capital for CCR which is being implemented by central banks.
A third aspect related to CCR which is being currently addressed has to do with pricing finan-
cial products. Counterparty risk has been gradually incorporated in valuation procedures, altering
the price to be charged for specific instruments in order to account for the default risk of the coun-
terparty. This change in price, CVA, appears as an option on the residual value of the portfolio,
with a random maturity given by the default time of the counterparty. Furthermore, if the investor
wants to account for the possibility of him defaulting, a second change on price should be added,
named Debt Valuation Adjustment (DVA). Both changes in price generate a source of risk that
needs to be taken into account.
The ubiquity of these concepts may lead to different definitions of CVA: an accounting one
for books and records, a front office CVA for pricing new deals and a regulatory CVA for defining
capital requirements. An accountant will comfortably accept the presence of DVA in defining
fair value as the natural contrary of CVA. A trader, though, will complain against considering an
adjustment that takes into account the possibility of him defaulting, becoming virtually impossible
to hedge (who would buy the insured insurance insuring the insured?) These misalignments can
lead to inappropriate trading decisions, with apparently profitable trades not appearing that way to
shareholders.
A recent survey2 about current market practices on CCR showed a rapid evolution along the
past two to three years motivated by changes in regulatory and accounting guidelines. Banks are
focusing on building models for advanced capital treatments, including collateral optimization and
funding. Effort is also being placed on quantifying Wrong Way Risk (WWR), that is, the risk that
2See [DeloitSolum]
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the exposure to our counterparty gets higher when its credit quality worsens, that gets captured by
jointly simulating credit spreads and underlying risk factors.
The same survey unveiled a clear divergence in approaches and methodologies across the
market. While the use of risk-neutral default probabilities via credit spreads is becoming a standard
practice in the quantification of CVA, DVA considerations and the extent to which it should be used
to reduce CVA charges is a source of variation. Further ambiguities related to possible funding
adjustments, outside the Basel III mandate but subject of increased focus, adds to the confusion,
ensuring that CCR will remain a hot topic for a long time.
1.2 Literature on CCR
Literature on bilateral counterparty risk is extensive and relatively recent. Although some refer-
ences can be traced back to the 1990s3, the review on CCR triggered by the 2008 credit events has
contributed to generate a huge amount of works on this topic. A good (and entertaining) survey
can be found at [Brigo11].
Since the early 2000s, Damiano Brigo himself has written several papers on counterparty
credit risk. A typical work by Brigo is configured as follows:
1. Enunciation of a model-free bilateral counterparty risk valuation formula based on expecta-
tions and default indicator functions.
2. Focus on a particular type of product. At this stage, a concrete model is needed, typically
a Gaussian two factor (G2++) model for interest rates, Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) without
jumps for credit and Schwartz-Smith for commodities.
3. Numerical analysis, either computing sensitivities from a range of values for specific pa-
rameters or calibrating the model to real data.
Complexity on the first step has been gradually increased when valuing financial products.
There exists a growing trend in the banking industry on modeling collateral treatment rather than
3See, for example, [DuffieHuang]
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relying on simplifications for the sake of capital optimization. In this context, recent works, like
[Brigoetal11] or [Brigoetal12], generalize the framework for arbitrage-free valuation of bilateral
counterparty risk to the case where collateral is included, with possible re-hypotecation.
Another source of variation has to do with adding jumps when modeling credit. Brigo himself
has written some papers applying SSRJD (Shifted Square Root Jump Diffusion) for default inten-
sities, like [BrigoElBachir]. [LiptonSepp] even compute CVA for credit default swaps including
jumps. However, the complexity of the numerical methods required to successfully manage this
type of models has prevented the literature to tackle this topic in depth.
1.3 The Spanish case
This paper is focused on the Spanish financial sector for two reasons. First, few studies, if any,
have modeled the dynamics of credit spreads in this market, and prefer to analyze those of Amer-
ican or British companies instead. However, the Spanish financial sector has behaved in a rather
unorthodox manner when compared to other European counterparts. As we shall see below, at
the beginning of the crisis, Spanish banks were regarded as one of the most solid entities in the
continent, having escaped from the subprime mortgage meltdown at the other side of the Atlantic.
However, as time went by, the situation reversed. International financial markets calmed down and
the focus was put on the soundness of the Spanish recession and its effects on its financial entities.
This quick twist, with two opposite situations in less than five years, gives us another reason for
studying the Spanish case.
The Spanish financial sector is highly concentrated. As pointed in [VillOhan], at the end of
2008 there were 362 credit institutions operating in Spain, with 159 banks that represented 53.53
percent of total assets and 46 savings and loans (cajas), which accumulated an additional 38.40
percent. However, among the banks, Banco Santander controlled assets of over $1.4 trillion and
BBVA of around $0.75 trillion. In comparison, the then third largest bank, Banco Popular, had
assets of only around $150 billion.
Traditionally, Spanish banks and cajas have held long-standing relations with industry, both
in terms of controlling equity positions in companies and through large credits. For individuals,
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Spanish banks offer their clients a wide variety of products including deposits, mortgages, credit
cards or pension funds. Additionally, although there have been some insights on investment bank-
ing, the local monetary authority, the Banco de Espan˜a, has prevented Spanish banks from playing
with complicated structured investment vehicles. Securitization, despite increasing, involved in-
struments much less complicated than in the U.S. and banks kept most of the credit risk in their
own balances.
The apparent universal character of Spanish banks masked the excessive concentration of their
lending in the real estate sector. The economic recession that hit Spain at the end of 2008, when the
National Statistics Institute first published negative figures of GDP, revealed the ongoing collapse
of a real estate bubble and the subsequent meltdown of Spanish economy. Local unemployment
rates doubling EU average and concerns about the possibility of a financial bailout, that finally
took place in June 2012, rocketed local Treasury yields. Despite their international character and
diversification, both Santander and BBVA were not immune to the situation in their country of
origin. Figure 1 displays the evolution of the 5 year Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads for some
of the biggest Euro area banks between 2010 and 2013. Starting in comparable levels, as time goes
by only Italian banks, Unicredito and Intesa San Paolo, exhibit spreads in line with Santander and
BBVA, while CDS from German and French banks are perceived by the market as much less risky.
Figure 1: Evolution of CDS5y for main Euro area banks (2010-2013)
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This asymmetry between peripheral and core European countries will influence the pricing
of financial products if counterparty risk valuation adjustments are taken into account. As an
example, imagine a firm engaged in a loan linked to a floating reference who is willing to get rid
of interest rate risk by entering a payer swap (paying fixed and receiving floating). Formerly, in
this swap, a solid firm would pay the same fixed amount than another on the verge of defaulting
(the swap rate). If CVA is added, the bad firm will be charged with a prohibitively high spread
over the swap rate compared with the good one. Conversely, if DVA is taken into account, the firm
will be tempted to close the deal with a troubled bank, since the spread it will charge to her will
be lower. Further paradoxical effects can appear if correlations are taken into account.
1.4 This paper
Our purpose here will be analyzing the effects of the financial crisis in counterparty risk valua-
tion adjustments. Following the arbitrage-free valuation framework presented in [Brigoetal09],
we will consider a model with stochastic Gaussian interest rates and CIR++ default intensities.
Departing from previous literature, we will be able to calibrate default intensities profiting from
Gaussian mapping techniques presented in [BrigoAlfonsi04], and reproduce the historically ob-
served instantaneous covariances of CDS prices. We will calculate adjustments involving the two
major Spanish banks, BBVA and Santander, and a generic European counterpart before and along
the Spanish recession in both interest rate and credit derivatives. We shall allow for credit spread
volatility, correlation between the default times of the investor and counterparty, and for correla-
tion of each with interest rates, and will investigate the effects of incorporating counterparty risk
valuation adjustments in pricing.
The paper is structured as follows: Sections 2 summarizes the counterparty risk valuation
framework from [Brigoetal09], establishing the appropriate notation. Section 3 describes the re-
duced form model setup of the paper with stochastic interest rates and intensities plus a copula on
the exponential triggers. Section 4 presents the calibration procedure for interest rates along with
estimation results. Section 5 deals with the calibration of default intensities, presenting the market
of Credit Default Swaps and the application of the Gaussian mapping technique in our modeling
framework to generate a closed-form expression for the price of a CDS, showing estimation re-
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sults. Section 6 presents counterparty credit risk valuation adjustments in several scenarios for
an interest rate swap and Section 7 does the same for a Credit Default Swap. Finally, Section 8
concludes.
2 Arbitrage-free valuation of counterparty risk
There exists no consensus in the banking industry about how to calculate counterparty risk credit
valuation adjustments. For a long time, the debate focused on whether the entity should account
for the possibility of its own default, including DVA in the valuation (symmetric CVA), or whether
it should consider itself default-free (asymmetric CVA). Basel II defined counterparty credit risk
as the one arising from the possibility that the counterparty to a transaction could default before
the final settlement of the transaction’s cash flows. No explicit mention about considering the
own default was done. Nevertheless, new accountancy and regulatory rules have stressed the
importance of fair value, taking asymmetric CVA off the table and inducing financial entities to
include DVA in the quantification of counterparty risk.
However, there is still a source of divergence around bilateral counterparty risk. CVA reflects
the economic loss to the investor in case the counterparty defaults. Conversely, DVA does the same
for the counterparty in case the investor cannot fulfill his obligations. Once we are admitting that
both participants in the transaction can default, we might need to reconsider the definitions outlined
above. CVA would reflect the economic loss to the investor in case the counterparty defaults before
the investor. The same applies to DVA, which would become the loss to the counterparty in case
the investor defaults before the counterparty. This approach is called contingent CVA. We will
explore valuation adjustments in these two situations, contingent and non-contingent, defining a
general arbitrage-free valuation framework for both approximations.
There exists a third matter of discussion when computing these adjustments. Under the In-
ternational Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 2009 protocol, in the event of default, the
closeout amount ”may take into account the creditworthiness of the Determining Party”, suggest-
ing that an institution may consider their own DVA in determining the amount to be settled. This is
called the ”risky closeout” paradigm, as opposed to the ”risk-free closeout” one, where the value
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of the transactions to be settled in the event of default is based on risk-free valuation. For sim-
plicity, we shall follow the latter paradigm. Both approaches have their shortcomings, outlined in,
for example, [GregGerm]. Currently, there is a hot debate around this issue which is beyond the
scope of this paper.
Following the notation of [Brigoetal09], we will refer to the two names involved in the trans-
action and subject to default risk as investor, named I, and counterparty, named C. Valuation will
be seen from the point of view of the investor I, so that cash flows received by I will be positive
whereas cash flows paid by I (and received by C) will be negative.
We denote by τI and τC respectively the default times of the investor and counterparty. We
place ourselves in a probability space (Ω;G;Gt;Q). The filtration Gt models the flow of infor-
mation of the whole market, including credit, and Q is the risk neutral measure. This space is
endowed also with a right-continuous and complete sub-filtration F representing all the observ-
able market quantities but the default events.
2.1 Contingent CVA
Let us call T the final maturity of the payoff which we need to evaluate and let us define the
stopping time
τ = min{τI , τC}
If τ > T , there is neither default of the investor, nor of his counterparty during the life of the
contract and they both can fulfill the agreements of the contract. On the contrary, if τ ≤ T then
either the investor or his counterparty (or both) default. At τ , the Net Present Value (NPV) of the
residual payoff until maturity is computed. We can distinguish two cases:
• τ = τC : If the NPV is negative for the investor, it is completely paid by the investor itself. If
the NPV is positive for the investor, only a recovery fraction RECC of the NPV is exchanged.
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• τ = τI : If the NPV is positive for the defaulted investor, it is completely received by the
defaulted investor itself. If the NPV is negative for the defaulted investor, only a recovery
fraction RECI of the NPV is exchanged.
We can define the following (mutually exclusive and exhaustive) events ordering the default
times:
A = {τI ≤ τC ≤ T} E = {T ≤ τI ≤ τC}
B = {τI ≤ T ≤ τC} F = {T ≤ τC ≤ τI}
C = {τC ≤ τI ≤ T}
D = {τC ≤ T ≤ τI}
Notice that A to D are the default events, while E and F are the non-default ones.
Let us call ΠD(t;T ) the discounted payoff of a generic defaultable claim at t and Π(t;T ) the
discounted payoff for an equivalent claim with a default-free counterparty. We then have that at
valuation time t, and conditional on the event {τ > t}, the price of the payoff under bilateral
counterparty risk is:
Et[ΠD(t, T )] = Et[Π(t, T )] +
Et[LGDI1{A∪B}D(t, τI)(−NPV (τI))+]−
Et[LGDC1{C∪D}D(t, τC)(NPV (τC))+]
Where E is the risk-neutral expectation, RECi is the recovery fraction with i ∈ {I, C}, and
LGDi = 1− RECi is the loss given default.
Therefore, the value of a defaultable claim is the value of the corresponding default-free claim
plus a long position in a put option plus a short position in a call option.
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The second term and the third term being subtracted from the second one are called respec-
tively Debit Valuation Adjustment (DVA) and Credit Valuation Adjustment.
2.2 Non-contingent CVA
In the non-contingent approach, each participant in the transaction considers itself default-free.
Using the same notation than above, the adjustment calculated by the investor would be:
Et[LGDC1{τC<T}D(t, τC)(NPV (τC))
+]
While the one calculated by the counterparty would be:
Et[LGDI1{τI<T}D(t, τI)(−NPV (τI))+]
The main drawback of this approximation is that one adjustment is not the opposite of the
other as in the contingent case. Therefore, the two parties would not agree on the value of the
counterparty risk adjustment to be added to the default free price unless one of them was default-
free.
3 A dynamic model for default intensity and interest rates
To price CVA and DVA we must consider a model with stochastic intensity and interest rates. As
exposed in [Schonbucher], there are basically two types of tractable approaches when trying to
model credit and interest rates simultaneously:
1. The Gaussian setup. This framework suffers from the possibility of reaching negative credit
spreads and interest rates with positive probability, but a high degree of analytical tractability
is retained.
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2. The Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) setup. This approach gives us the required properties of
non-negativity, but it loses some analytical tractability.
Non-negative intensities are even more desirable than non-negative interest rates since credit
traditionally shows higher levels of volatility. Thus, to ensure non-negative intensities while re-
taining as much analytical tractability as possible, we follow the hybrid approach of [Brigoetal09]:
Gaussian setup for interest rates, and CIR for intensities.
3.1 Interest rate model
For interest rates, we will assume that the dynamics of the instantaneous short-rate process under
the risk-neutral measure Q will be given by a G2++:
r(t) = x(t) + z(t) + ϕ(t, α) (1)
where α is a set of parameters and the processes x and z are Ft adapted and satisfy{
dx(t) = −ax(t)dt+ σdW1(t), x(0) = 0
dz(t) = −bz(t)dt+ ηdW2(t), z(0) = 0 (2)
where (W1,W2) is a two-dimensional Brownian motion with instantaneous correlation ρ12,
being −1 ≤ ρ12 ≤ 1, and a, b, σ and η are positive constants. These are the parameters defining
α = [a, b, σ, η, ρ12]. The function ϕ(t, α) is set to match the initial zero coupon curve observed in
the market.
3.2 Counterparty and Investor Credit Spread models
For the stochastic intensity models we will set
λit = y
i
t + ψ
i(t, βi), i ∈ {I, C} (3)
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The function ψ is a deterministic function and is set to match the initial CDS spread curve. y
is assumed to be a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process under the risk-neutral measure:
dyit = κ
i(µi − yit)dt+ νi
√
yitdW
i
3(t), i ∈ {I, C} (4)
where the parameter vector is βi = (κi, µi, νi, yi0) and each parameter is a positive determinis-
tic constant. Notice that, in principle, yi0 is a parameter at our disposal. y
i
t will be always positive
as long as 2κiµi > (νi)2. As usual, W i3 is a standard Brownian motion process under the risk
neutral measure.
3.3 Spread correlation
Short interest-rate factors x and z are correlated with the intensity process y through their driving
Brownian motions:
dWjdW
i
3 = ρjidt, j ∈ {1, 2}, i ∈ {I, C}
In order to reduce the number of free parameters, we will proceed as in [Brigoetal09], and
consider that
ρ1i = ρ2i, i ∈ {I, C}
Further, we also allow for correlation between default intensities of the investor and the coun-
terparty:
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dW I3 dW
C
3 = ρICdt
3.4 Default correlation
Cumulated intensity can be defined as:
Λ(t) =
∫ t
0
λs ds
such that Q{τ ≥ t} = exp{−Λ(t)}. We are in a Cox process setting, where:
τi = Λ−1i (ξi), i ∈ {I, C}
with ξI and ξC standard (unit-mean) exponential random variables. We impose their associated
uniforms Ui = 1− exp(−ξi), i ∈ {I, C} to be correlated through a copula function. Thus,
Q{UI < uI , UC < uC} = C(uI , uC)
We choose copula C to be Gaussian with correlation parameter ρCop . Notice that this is
a default correlation, connecting default times even if spreads were independent. As pointed in
[Brigoetal09], where a Gaussian copula is used too, in general high default correlation creates
more dependence between default times than a high correlation in spreads.
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3.5 Monte Carlo techniques
Payoffs will be valued using Monte Carlo simulation.
The transition density for the G2++ model is known in closed form. As shown in, for example,
[BrigoMercurio], let us consider the stochastic process
dx(t) = −kx(t)dt+ ζdW (t), x(0) = 0
Then, for t ≥ s, x(t) is normally distributed with mean x(s) exp{−k(t − s)} and variance
ζ2
2k [1− exp{−2k(t− s)}].
Regarding default intensities, we will use the Euler Implicit positivity-preserving scheme pre-
sented in [BrigoAlfonsi04]. If we consider the CIR process:
dy(t) = κ(µ− y(t))dt+ ν
√
y(t)dW (t)
Then, for t ≥ s, we have:
√
y(t) =
ν(Wt −Ws) +
√
ν2(Wt −Ws)2 + 4
[
ys + (κµ− 0.5ν2)(t− s)
]
[1 + κ(t− s)]
2[1 + κ(t− s)]
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4 Calibration of interest rates
4.1 Calibration procedure
The parameters of the interest-rate model under the risk-neutral measure can be calibrated to the
surface of at-the-money (ATM) swaption volatilities. A swaption is an option on an interest rate
swap (IRS). There are basically two types of swaptions: payer and receiver.
A European payer swaption gives the right (but not the obligation) to enter a payer IRS (paying
fixed, receiving floating) of a given length (tenor) at a given fixed rate (strike) and at a given future
time (maturity). Conversely, a European receiver swaption gives the right to enter a receiver IRS
(receiving fixed, paying floating).
Consider a swaption with strike SK , maturity T = t0 and swap payment times T = {t1, ..., tn},
t1 > T . It is a common practice to value swaptions with a Black-like formula. In this setup, the
price of a swaption is4:
ESBlack(0, T, T , SK , ω;σ) = ω
n∑
i=1
τiP (0, Ti)
[
S(0)Φ(ωd1)− SKΦ(ωd2)
]
where ω = 1 (ω = −1) for a payer (receiver) swaption, S(0) is the forward swap rate, P (0, T )
is the discount factor between 0 and T , τi the year fraction from ti−1 to ti, Φ is the standard normal
cdf, and
d1 =
ln(S(0)/SK)+σ
2T/2
σ
√
T
d2 = d1 − σ
√
T
Swaption prices are typically displayed in a matrix, where each row is indexed by the swaption
maturity Tα, whereas each column is indexed in terms of the underlying swap length, Tβ−Tα. The
x×y-swaption is then the swaption in the table whose maturity is x years and whose underlying
swap is y years long. Thus a 2×10 swaption is a swaption maturing in two years and giving then
4See [Hull]
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the right to enter a ten-year swap. It is a common practice to quote Black-volatilities instead of
prices.
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y
1y 66.9 64.5 57.9 53.3 47.1 42.7 39.2 36.6 34.3 32.5
2y 58.7 52.6 57.1 43.2 40.4 37.2 34.9 33.1 31.7 30.6
3y 50.6 44.7 40.6 37.6 35.6 33.4 31.8 30.5 29.5 28.6
4y 42.2 37.8 35.1 33.0 31.5 30.1 29.1 28.2 27.6 27.0
5y 36.0 33.1 31.2 29.7 28.6 27.8 27.1 26.5 26.1 25.8
7y 28.3 27.3 26.2 25.5 25.1 24.7 24.5 24.4 24.4 24.4
10y 23.1 23.0 22.7 22.6 22.7 22.8 23.0 23.3 23.6 23.7
Table 1: ATM swaption volatilities. 07-Feb-2013
[BrigoMercurio] find out the expression for European swaption prices under G2++, shown
in Appendix A. Using this formula, swaption prices can be fitted to the market data surface by
minimizing square errors, that is, we solve
α̂ = argmin
α
∑
i
[ESBlackATM (0, Ti, Ti;σMkt)− ESATM (0, Ti, Ti;α)]2
Notice that we match swaption prices obtained from market quoted volatilities. Once we have
obtained the parameters of α = [a, b, σ, η, ρ12], we can use ϕ(t, α) to automatically fit the initial
zero coupon curve:
ϕ(t, α) = f(0, t) +
σ2
2
B(a, 0, t)2 +
η2
2
B(b, 0, t)2 + ρ12σηB(a, 0, t)B(b, 0, t)
where f(0, t) is the instantaneous forward rate at time 0 for a maturity t implied by the initial
zero coupon curve:
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f(0, T ) = −∂ lnP (0, T )
∂T
4.2 Estimation results
We intend to capture counterparty valuation adjustments in two different scenarios, depending
on whether the market considered Spanish financial institutions to be more or less solvent than
the average European company. Figure 2 displays the evolution of 5-year tenor CDS of BBVA,
Santander and iTraxx Europe from 2007 to the beginning of 2013. We will pick two dates for our
analysis, only four years apart: February 2009 and February 2013. The first can be regarded as
the last moment before the situation reversed: although Lehman Brothers had expired only a few
months ago, financial markets were starting to calm down, while Spain had just entered recession.
The latter date, however, depicts a moment somewhat less stressed than June 2012, when Spain
accepted the financial bailout, but still the market made a clear distinction between Spanish and
European institutions. To capture the recent dynamics on each case, we will use two years of data
from these two moments backwards.
Figure 2: Evolution of CDS5y for BBVA, Santander and iTraxx Europe (2007-2013)
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4.2.1 After the crisis
We calibrate the risk-neutral dynamics to the surface of ATM swaption volatilities on 07 February
2013. Minimization of the sum of the squares of the percentage differences between model and
market swaption prices produces the following calibrated parameters: a = 0.56160993, b =
0.011979556, σ = 0.005145749, η = 0.007824323 and ρ12 = −0.780480924. Calibration
results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. In the first, we show the fitted swaption volatilities
as implied by the G2++ model, whereas in the second we report the absolute differences. Apart
from some exceptions in the shortest maturities, differences are rather low given that we are fitting
seventy prices with only five parameters:
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y
1y 105.0 86.1 71.4 60.0 51.9 46.0 41.7 38.5 36.0 34.1
2y 72.4 61.6 52.7 46.4 41.8 38.3 35.7 33.7 32.1 30.7
3y 52.7 46.0 41.3 37.8 35.1 33.1 31.5 30.2 29.1 28.3
4y 40.0 36.8 34.3 32.3 30.8 29.5 28.5 27.6 27.0 26.5
5y 33.4 31.6 30.1 28.9 28.0 27.2 26.5 26.0 25.6 25.1
7y 26.8 26.3 25.7 25.3 24.8 24.6 24.3 24.0 24.2 24.3
10y 23.5 23.3 23.5 23.4 23.1 23.7 24.0 24.1 24.1 24.0
Table 2: G2++ calibrated swaption volatilities. 07-Feb-2013
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y
1y 38.1 21.6 13.6 6.7 4.8 3.3 2.5 2.0 1.7 1.6
2y 13.7 9.0 5.6 3.2 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.1
3y 2.1 1.3 0.7 0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3
4y -2.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5
5y -2.6 -1.6 -1.1 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.7
7y -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1
10y 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.3
Table 3: Swaption calibration results: absolute differences. 07-Feb-2013
4.2.2 Before the crisis
We calibrate the risk-neutral dynamics to the surface of ATM swaption volatilities on 06 February
2009, just before the Spanish economy started entering recession. Minimization of the sum of
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the squares of the percentage differences between model and market swaption prices produces
the following calibrated parameters: a = 0.03027296, b = 0.040462377 , σ = 0.008905182,
η = 0.008788244 and ρ12 = −0.378510205. Calibration results are summarized in Tables 4
and 5. In this case, there are no extreme differences as in 2013. Instead, we observe a sort of
V-structure, with high and positive differences for short tenors and large maturities that decrease
with tenor and become negative for short maturities.
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y
1y 41.7 35.1 31.2 28.6 26.5 24.9 23.6 22.5 21.5 20.8
2y 30.9 28.2 26.2 24.6 23.3 22.2 21.3 20.5 19.8 19.2
3y 26.4 24.8 23.4 22.3 21.3 20.5 19.8 19.2 18.6 18.3
4y 23.9 22.6 21.6 20.7 19.9 19.2 18.7 18.1 17.9 17.6
5y 21.8 20.9 20.1 19.4 18.7 18.3 17.7 17.5 17.3 16.9
7y 19.4 18.7 18.1 17.7 17.2 17.1 16.9 16.5 16.7 16.8
10y 17.6 16.9 17.1 16.9 16.5 16.9 17.1 17.1 17.0 16.8
Table 4: G2++ calibrated swaption volatilities. 06-Feb-2009
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y
1y 1.2 1.3 0.1 -1.0 -2.1 -2.9 -3.7 -4.5 -5.2 -5.9
2y 5.5 4.6 3.2 2.1 1.1 0.2 -0.7 -1.5 -2.4 -3.3
3y 5.7 4.7 3.4 2.4 1.5 0.6 -0.1 -0.8 -1.6 -2.0
4y 5.5 4.4 3.3 2.4 1.5 0.8 0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -1.3
5y 5.0 4.1 3.1 2.3 1.5 1.1 0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.9
7y 4.2 3.4 2.6 2.2 1.5 1.3 0.9 0.2 0.1 -0.1
10y 3.2 2.5 2.4 2.0 1.3 1.3 1.2 0.7 0.2 -0.4
Table 5: Swaption calibration results: absolute differences. 06-Feb-2009
5 Calibration of default intensities
5.1 Introduction
Literature has not been conclusive about how to calibrate the dynamics of default intensities. In
general terms, quotes for CDS options, specially single name, are considered illiquid and not
reliable. Therefore, one needs to rely entirely on CDS prices. The typical calibration procedure
can be schematized as follows:
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1. Assume independency between interest rates and default intensities.
2. Guess a suitable β.
3. Set ρ to a desired value.
Notice that there is some contradiction between steps 1 and 3, since we are assuming zero cor-
relation first to depart from that assumption at the end. However, literature has repeatedly shown5
that correlations have a small impact on CDS prices, so the consequences of this contradiction are
negligible.
Regarding step 2, some works specify ”reasonable” values for the parameters, as in [BrigoPallav].
Another usual approach, followed by, for example, [BrigoChourd] for a CIR++ for both interest
rates and default intensities, consists on imposing some constraints in the calibration of CDS. In
their case, they require β to be found that keep Ψ positive and increasing6, which is achieved by
setting 2κµ > ν2, and that minimize
∫ T
0 Ψ(s, β)
2ds. This minimization amounts to contain the
departure of λ from its time-homogeneous component y as much as possible. Unfortunately, this
approach involves using no real information about the evolution of intensities.
We will propose a method that will allow us to calibrate intensities from historical market data.
By using several approximations, we will be able to obtain a closed-form expression for both CDS
prices and instantaneous covariances among them, that will be fitted to observed historical ones.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows: first, we will give a quick overview of
Credit Default Swaps. Then, we will present separability, that is, the assumption of independency
between interest rates and default intensities. As we shall see, this will allow us to easily price CDS
contracts in our modeling framework. Next, we will depart from separability, and still, using some
approximations, we will reach a closed form expression for the price of a CDS. Then, applying
some stochastic calculus to this expression plus some approximations, we will come out with an
expression for the instantaneous covariance between different CDS contracts that can be used to
5See, for example, [BrigoAlfonsi04]
6A definition of Ψ will be shown in equation ( 7)
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calibrate the dynamics of default intensities. Finally, we apply this method to the same two periods
described above for interest rate calibration and show some results.
5.2 Credit Default Swaps
A credit default swap is a contract ensuring protection against default. Two companies, named
”A” and ”B”, agree on the following:
If a third reference company ”C” defaults at time τ < T , where T is the maturity of the
contract, ”B” pays to ”A” a certain amount of cash LGD. This cash is a protection for ”A” in case
”C” defaults.
In exchange for this protection, company ”A” agrees to pay periodically to ”B” a fixed amount
S. Payments occur at times T = {T1, ..., Tn}, day-count-fractions are described as αi = Ti−Ti−1,
T0 = 0, fixed in advance at time 0 up to default time τ if this occurs before maturity T , or until
maturity T otherwise.
Credit events are carefully defined in CDS contracts, and they typically include bankruptcy,
failure to pay, restructuring, obligation acceleration, obligation default and repudiation. A detailed
survey on configuration and settlement of CDS contracts can be found in [Gregory10].
Formally, we may write the CDS discounted value to ”B” at time t as:
1{τ>t}
(
D(t, τ)(τ − Tβ(t)−1)1{τ<Tn}S +
n∑
i=β(t)
D(t, Ti)αi1{τ>Ti}S − 1{τ<T}D(t, τ)LGD
)
where t ∈ [Tβ(t)−1, Tβ(t)), i.e. Tβ(t) is the first date of T1, ..., Tn following t. The stochastic
discount factor at time t for maturity T is denoted by D(t, T ) = B(t)/B(T ), where B(t) =
exp(
∫ t
0 rudu) denotes the bank-account numeraire, r being the instantaneous short interest rate.
We denote by CDS(t, T , T, S, LGD) the price of the above CDS. We can compute this price
according to risk-neutral valuation as in [BielRut]:
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CDS(t, T , T, S, LGD) = 1{τ>t}E
[
D(t, τ)(τ − Tβ(t)−1)1{τ<Tn}S
+
n∑
i=β(t)
D(t, Ti)αi1{τ>Ti}S − 1{τ<T}D(t, τ)LGD
∣∣∣Gt] (5)
5.3 Separability
Let us assume independence between interest rates and default intensities, i.e., ρ1i = ρ2i = 0,
i = I, C. In this case, we can separate some terms in expression ( 5) and get the following model
independent formula:
CDS(t, T , T, S, LGD)0 = LGD
[ ∫ Tn
T0
P (0, t)dtQ{τi ≥ t}
]
+S
[ ∫ Tn
T0
P (0, t)(t− Tβ(t)−1)dtQ{τi ≥ t}
+
n∑
j=1
αjP (0, Tj)Q{τi ≥ Tj}
] (6)
where we have assumed a constant LGD, Q{τ ≥ T} is the survival probability at T , and
dtQ{τ ≥ t} = Q{τ ∈ [t, t+ dt)}
Let us define the following integrated quantities:
Λ(t) =
∫ t
0 λs ds, Y (t) =
∫ t
0 ys ds, Ψ(t, β) =
∫ t
0 ψ(s, β) ds (7)
In the market, we can observe CDS spread quotes for several maturities Tn = 1y, 2y, ..., with
Ti’s resetting quarterly. We can assume a piecewise constant structure for implied hazard rates and
solve
CDS0,1y(S0,1y, LGD;λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = λ1Mkt) = 0;
CDS0,2y(S0,2y, LGD;λ1Mkt;λ5 = λ6 = λ7 = λ8 = λ
2
Mkt) = 0; ...
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iteratively, obtaining a function for the survival probabilities implied by the market:
QMkt{τ ≥ t} = exp{−ΛMkt(t)}
Back to our model, the survival probabilities are given by:
Q{τ ≥ t} = E0[exp(−Λ(t))] = E0[exp(−Ψ(t, β)− Y (t))]
If we match these probabilities to the ones observed in the market, we obtain:
Ψ(t, β) = ln
(
E0[e−Y (t)]
QMkt{τ ≥ t}
)
= ln(PCIR(0, t, y0;β)) + ΛMkt(t)
where PCIR is the closed form expression for bond prices in the time-homogeneous CIR
model with initial condition y0 and parameters β, given by:
PCIR(t, T, yt;β) = ACIR(t, T )eBCIR(t,T )yt
where
ACIR(t, T ) =
(
2h exp{(κ+h)(T−t)/2}
2h+(κ+h)(exp{(T−t)h}−1)
)2κµ/ν2
BCIR(t, T ) =
2(exp{(T−t)h}−1)
2h+(κ+h)(exp{(T−t)h}−1)
h =
√
κ2 + 2ν2
If β is chosen in order to have a positive function ψ, the model will be automatically calibrated
to the market survival probabilities stripped from CDS data.
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5.4 Departing from separability
The former chain of reasoning has relied on the possibility to disentangle survival probabilities
from discount factors. If ρ1i = ρ2i 6= 0, i = I, C, then formula ( 6) no longer holds and to
calibrate CDS data we need to solve
CDS(t, T , T, S, LGD) = 0
numerically to compute prices of CDS and use them to calibrate the model, which can be a
rather dramatic task. However, using Gaussian mapping techniques as in [BrigoAlfonsi04] we are
able to approximate formula ( 5) with a closed form solution to ease the calibration process:
CDS(t, T , T, S, LGD;xt, zt, yt) = S
∫ T
t e
− ∫ ut (ϕ(s,α)+ψ(s,β))ds[ψ(u, β)Ĥ2(u)
+Ĥ1(u)
]
(u− Tβ(u)−1)du
+S
n∑
i=1
αie
− ∫ Tit (ϕ(s,α)+ψ(s,β))dsĤ2(Ti)
−LGD ∫ Tt e− ∫ ut (ϕ(s,α)+ψ(s,β))ds[ψ(u, β)Ĥ2(u) + Ĥ1(u)]du
(8)
Details about the auxiliary functions Ĥi, as well as the derivation of the formula, can be found
in Appendix B.
5.5 Calibration procedure
We intend to obtain an expression for the instantaneous covariance between CDS spreads. To do
so, we first write our state variables in matricial form, and name:
X¯t =

x(t)
z(t)
yI(t)
yC(t)
 ; Wt =

W1(t)
W2(t)
W I3 (t)
WC3 (t)

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X¯t has the following dynamics:
dX¯t = O(dt) +
[
Σ1 + Σ2
√
X¯t
]
dWt
Where O(dt) are terms in dt and
Σ1 =

σ 0 0 0
0 η 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 ; Σ2 =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 νI 0
0 0 0 νC

By inverting equation ( 8), we can obtain a function ST for the par value of a CDS spread, that
is:
CDS(t, T , T, ST (t, X¯t), LGD; X¯t) = 0
We can apply Ito’s Lemma to find out the dynamics of the par spread of the CDS:
dST =
∂ST
∂t
+∇>ST (t, X¯t)dX¯t + 12dX¯
>
t ∇2ST (t, X¯t)dX¯t
where∇>ST (t, X¯t) and∇2ST (t, X¯t) are the gradient and hessian matrix of S with respect to
X¯ , respectively. We can isolate the terms in dt and get:
dST = O(dt) +∇>ST (t, X¯t)
[
Σ1 + Σ2
√
X¯t
]
dWt = O(dt) + ΣT (t, X¯t)dWt
25
We realize that the diffusion of the CDS spread is stochastic itself, since it depends on X¯t. We
propose to approximate it by taking:
ΣT (t, X¯t) ≈ ΣT (t, E[X¯t]) (9)
This assumption is similar to the one adopted in [AndPiterbarg] to proxy the dynamics of swap
rates. Additionally, we will need to impose that processes yI and yC start at their long-term mean,
that is, we state:
yi0 = µ
i, i ∈ {I, C}
To check the validity of the approximation taken in equation ( 9), we do three exercises with a
given set of parameters:
1. Historical: We simulate x(t), z(t) and y(t) along two years (500 time steps). For each day,
we compute the value of the CDS spread with equation ( 8) for different tenors, obtain their
daily increments and the standard deviation of them. We repeat this exercise 10,000 times
and return the average of the standard deviations.
2. One-day: We run 10,000 simulations of x(t), z(t) and y(t) for one day. We compute the
value of the CDS with equation ( 8) for different tenors, obtain their daily increments and
get the standard deviation.
3. Theoretical: We obtain the standard deviations with equation ( 10).
We repeat the exercise for three references: BBVA, Santander and iTraxx, using the parameters
obtained calibrating the period 2007-2009. As shown in Table 6, differences among the three
approaches are minimal.
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BBVA Historical One-day Theoretical
3Y 0.0540% 0.0539% 0.0540%
5Y 0.0524% 0.0524% 0.0524%
7Y 0.0508% 0.0509% 0.0508%
10Y 0.0485% 0.0484% 0.0486%
Santander Historical One-day Theoretical
3Y 0.0542% 0.0544% 0.0543%
5Y 0.0532% 0.0536% 0.0533%
7Y 0.0523% 0.0519% 0.0524%
10Y 0.0506% 0.0507% 0.0508%
iTraxx Historical One-day Theoretical
3Y 0.04575% 0.04593% 0.04569%
5Y 0.04446% 0.04459% 0.04445%
7Y 0.04308% 0.04331% 0.04321%
10Y 0.04119% 0.04113% 0.04130%
Table 6: Standard deviations of CDS increments
We will observe historical prices of CDS spreads of different maturities, T1 and T2, and differ-
ent counterparties, C1, C2 ∈ {I, C}. Then, the instantaneous covariance of their increments will
be given by:
ΣT1,C1(t, E[X¯t])ΩΣT2,C2(t, E[X¯t])
>dt (10)
where
Ω =

1 ρ12 ρ1I ρ1C
ρ12 1 ρ1I ρ1C
ρ1I ρ1I 1 ρIC
ρ1C ρ1C ρIC 1

Therefore, we will be able to calibrate the model by taking the variance-covariance matrix of
the daily increments of historical prices of CDS and fitting it to the parametric matrix. Since we
are dealing with instantaneous covariances, our reasoning is measure independent, so we can get
rid of the market price of risk and estimate the model in a consistent manner.
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5.6 Estimation results
For each period (before and along the Spanish recession), we take two years of data of CDS prices
from BBVA and Santander, the two leading Spanish banks. As a proxy for a general counterparty,
we will use iTraxx Europe. iTraxx is the brand name for the family of several credit default swap
index products. The most widely traded of the indices is the iTraxx Europe index, also known
simply as ”The Main”, composed of the most liquid 125 CDS referencing European investment
grade. Since we will calibrate the three references simultaneously, we will incorporate correlation
among the two investors’ intensities, i.e., BBVA and Santander. Therefore, we will obtain the
corresponding β for each reference, plus some additional cross-correlations. Let us call % the
vector containing all these parameters.
In our minimization problem, we will match standard deviations for the same CDS contract
and correlations for different ones. Since they have a different order of magnitude, we will need to
weight their contributions to the minimization function differently. The problem can be stated as:
%̂ = argmin
%
ωCorr
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i
[CorrHist(Si, Sj)− Corr(Si, Sj ; %)]2
+ωStd
n∑
i=1
[StdHist(Si)− Std(Si; %)]2
We first observe CDS prices on 7 February 2013 for the three references: BBVA, Santander
and iTraxx, and tenors 3y, 5y, 7y and 10y. If we extract hazard rates for that date, we observe that
the implied default probabilities of both Spanish banks are much higher than those of an average
European counterparty, as seen in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Hazard rates. 7-Feb-2013
However, if we repeat this exercise on 6 February 2009, we observe a completely different
situation. As seen in Figure 4, at the beginning of the crisis the implied default probability of
an average European counterparty was much higher than those of BBVA or Santander, especially
for short maturities. This can explained by the then ongoing mistrust environment, with entities
questioning each other’s balance sheets, but hoping that the situation would be clarified in the
medium term.
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Figure 4: Hazard rates. 6-Feb-2009
We use daily data for two periods: from 7 February 2013 to 7 February 2011, and from 6
February 2009 to 6 February 2007. With the interest rate parametrization detailed above for the
corresponding periods, we calibrate the historical correlation matrix. Calibrated parameters are
shown on Table 7. For a comparison between historical and parametric matrices, see Appendix
C.
6 A Spanish case study: interest rate swap
6.1 The payoff
The Bank for International Settlements reported in a recent review7 than over 60% of the en-
tire notional amount outstanding in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives corresponds to interest
rate swaps (IRS), becoming by far the largest category by instrument (the next one, forward rate
agreements, adds up to less than 9% of the aggregated notional). Thus, as a testing payoff, we
will consider a 10-year par interest rate swap with both legs paying annually and compute the
7BIS Quarterly Review, June 2013. Downloadable at www.bis.org/statistics/dt1920a.pdf (last accessed:
29 September 2013)
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Parameter 2007-2009 2011-2013
BBVA
κ1 2.7866% 2.5387%
µ1 11.8385% 22.8575%
ν1 5.2150% 9.0083%
Santander
κ2 1.2831% 10.5391%
µ2 11.3247% 20.0987%
ν2 5.2416% 11.5031%
iTraxx
κ3 2.8553% 2.7701%
µ3 6.4543% 8.9746%
ν3 5.9834% 4.6954%
ρ13 (Rates-BBVA) -20.0656% -22.2291%
ρ14 (Rates-Santander) -25.2547% -29.3652%
ρ15 (Rates-iTraxx) -25.9896% -18.4379%
ρ34 (BBVA-Santander) 91.1790% 90.9663%
ρ35 (BBVA-iTraxx) 81.3762% 82.4476%
ρ45 (Santander-iTraxx) 78.8252% 87.1892%
Table 7: Calibrated parameters
adjustments in several scenarios. We will also consider the case in which credit spreads are not
simulated, and survival probabilities are extracted as seen the initial day. This approach is the one
followed by most of the industry, since only one-third of banks model general WWR within CVA
calculation8, which is achieved by jointly simulating credit spreads and underlying risk factors,
linking credit worthiness and exposure. We will compute the adjustments in both the contingent
and non-contingent framework.
When computing the adjustments, default times will be bucketed by assuming that default
events can occur only on a time grid {Ti : 0 ≤ i < n}, with T0 = t and Tn = T , anticipating
each default event to the last Ti preceding it. A monthly time-grid spacing will be used to do
the calculations. Thus, credit valuation adjustments in the contingent case will be calculated as
follows:
8According to [DeloitSolum]
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CV A(t, T ) ' LGD
n−1∑
i=0
E[1{C∪D}D(t, Ti)ETi [NPV (Ti)
+]]
DV A(t, T ) ' LGD
n−1∑
i=0
E[1{A∪B}D(t, Ti)ETi [(−NPV (Ti))+]]
Similar expressions apply to the non-contingent case. Notice that ETi [·] refers to forward
expectations of the NPV of the underlying product. Since we are dealing with a simple IRS,
these expectations have a closed-form solution in our Gaussian framework. Had we dealt with a
more complicated payoff, we would have needed to use least-square regressions to estimate these
forward expectations, as usually done to price Bermudan options with the Least Squared Monte
Carlo Method.
There is no way to accurately estimate ρCop, that is, the correlation among default times of
the references. We will compute the adjustments for the contingent case in two scenarios, either
assuming it to be zero or equal to the estimated spread correlation. We consider iTraxx as the
investor and the Spanish banks as the counterparties. Finally, we also consider the case in which
BBVA plays the role of the investor with Santander as its counterparty.
6.2 Main findings
Results are shown in Tables 8 to 10. They confirm that both before and after the crisis, credit
valuation adjustments are relevant. If we recall that the risk-free price in all cases was zero since
the fixed leg of the IRS paid the initial swap rate, the adjustments, especially in 2013, look even
more impressive.
Both contingent and non-contingent adjustments reveal how difficult the situation became in
2013 for the Spanish financial sector relative to the European market. While in 2009 both CVA
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and DVA were similar in absolute terms (especially when adding volatility), in 2013 the average
European counterpart was charging a CVA of around -80bp to a Spanish bank, while her DVA was
just around 15bp, and it was lowered to a few basis points if default correlation was added. This
makes sense: if my counterparty is much worse than me, and indeed we are positively correlated
(the spread correlation, which was used as default correlation too, was around 80%), then my
counterparty will default before than me in almost all cases, so DVA will be non-existent in the
contingent approach.
We also notice the importance of modeling the dynamics on rigorous CVA valuation. Despite
being an interest rate payoff and a low estimated correlation between default intensities and interest
rates, including credit volatilities can impact CVA up to 30% (from -76bp to -57bp for BBVA vs
Santander in 2013, with contingency and no default correlation) or DVA up to 60% (from near
20bp to near 35pb for iTraxx vs Santander in 2009, non-contingent).
2009 2013
iTraxx vs BBVA No Vol Vol No Vol Vol
CVA -0.36796% -0.31464% -0.91614% -0.82017%
DVA 0.19196% 0.29932% 0.13868% 0.15685%
iTraxx vs Santander No Vol Vol No Vol Vol
CVA -0.39038% -0.29407% -0.87382% -0.71121%
DVA 0.19166% 0.29589% 0.14076% 0.15308%
BBVA vs Santander No Vol Vol No Vol Vol
CVA -0.40694% -0.29678% -0.75580% -0.57484%
DVA 0.14649% 0.24778% 0.29640% 0.36900%
Table 8: Contingent CVA for IR Swap. Copula correlation zero
7 Another case study: CDS
Furthermore, we explore the effects of incorporating credit dynamics when computing counter-
party valuation adjustments in credit derivatives. Since we have already developed an expression
for the valuation of a Credit Default Swap (CDS) in our modeling framework, we can use it to
compute the exposures embedded in the CVA-DVA formula.
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2009 2013
iTraxx vs BBVA No Vol Vol No Vol Vol
CVA -0.22224% -0.22241% -0.90653% -0.84264%
DVA 0.16376% 0.25718% 0.05115% 0.05691%
iTraxx vs Santander No Vol Vol No Vol Vol
CVA -0.24812% -0.21071% -0.87177% -0.72775%
DVA 0.16380% 0.25050% 0.04322% 0.03821%
BBVA vs Santander No Vol Vol No Vol Vol
CVA -0.28124% -0.20970% -0.51686% -0.42515%
DVA 0.09875% 0.16936% 0.22340% 0.28221%
Table 9: Contingent CVA for IR Swap. Copula correlation equal to spread correlation
2009 2013
iTraxx vs BBVA No Vol Vol No Vol Vol
CVA -0.41894% -0.37074% -1.01071% -0.93383%
DVA 0.20494% 0.34698% 0.17533% 0.23514%
iTraxx vs Santander No Vol Vol No Vol Vol
CVA -0.44534% -0.34706% -0.96482% -0.81212%
DVA 0.20487% 0.34688% 0.17536% 0.23521%
BBVA vs Santander No Vol Vol No Vol Vol
CVA -0.44524% -0.34697% -0.96500% -0.81231%
DVA 0.15843% 0.29997% 0.35567% 0.52179%
Table 10: Non Contingent CVA for IR Swap
In an in-depth study on CDS transactions, [Chenetal] found that both single-name and index
contracts were most frequently traded in 5 year maturities, with 47% of all single-name transac-
tions and 84% of indices being traded in the 5 year tenor. Therefore, as a testing payoff we will
consider 5-year par CDS’s and compute the adjustments in several scenarios. Contracts will be
written on the third reference not involved in the transaction, i.e., in the case of iTraxx vs San-
tander, we are referring to iTraxx (the investor) selling protection to Santander (the counterparty)
on BBVA9. As we did above, we will also consider the case in which credit spreads are not sim-
ulated at all. Here we introduce a further case in which spreads are simulated when computing
exposures but not when calculating the survival probabilities for the CVA-DVA formula, which
9This situation is quite unlikely, since both Spanish banks are highly correlated and buying default protection on
each other would be regarded as unsafe. However, we use this example to highlight the effects of high correlation levels
on the adjustments.
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are extracted as seen the initial day. Despite the clear inconsistency existing in this scenario, that
we will call ”Volatility only in Expected Exposure” or ”Vol EE”, we compute it for didactical
purposes.
As shown on Tables 11 to 13, the effect of modeling the dynamics of credit spreads is much
stronger when referred to credit derivatives. CVA and DVA, almost non existent in all cases under
static credit spreads, jumps in the dynamic scenarios. As an example, in 2013 CVA for iTraxx
vs BBVA in the contingent case drops from -1bp with no volatility to -6bp (to -8bp if default
correlation is set to zero). Even more astounding is the effect on DVA in, for instance, iTraxx vs
Santander, where DVA jumps from less than 2bp to around 24bp if default correlation is set to zero.
The same case highlights the relevance of the distinction between contingent and non-contingent
adjustments, since DVA drops back to 2bp if default correlation is considered.
2009 2013
iTraxx vs BBVA No Vol Vol EE Vol No Vol Vol EE Vol
CVA -0.0052% -0.0555% -0.0127% -0.0129% -0.2669% -0.0585%
DVA 0.0007% 0.0915% 0.1442% 0.0159% 0.1302% 0.2465%
iTraxx vs Santander No Vol Vol EE Vol No Vol Vol EE Vol
CVA -0.0104% -0.0588% -0.0141% -0.0141% -0.2588% -0.0436%
DVA 0.0000% 0.0857% 0.1376% 0.0150% 0.1316% 0.2359%
BBVA vs Santander No Vol Vol EE Vol No Vol Vol EE Vol
CVA -0.0362% -0.0668% -0.0282% -0.0016% -0.0720% -0.0139%
DVA 0.0000% 0.0360% 0.0815% 0.0550% 0.1394% 0.2508%
Table 11: Contingent CVA for CDS. Copula correlation zero
2009 2013
iTraxx vs BBVA No Vol Vol EE Vol No Vol Vol EE Vol
CVA -0.0033% -0.0353% -0.0086% -0.0119% -0.2244% -0.0783%
DVA 0.0006% 0.0788% 0.1294% 0.0063% 0.0475% 0.0843%
iTraxx vs Santander No Vol Vol EE Vol No Vol Vol EE Vol
CVA -0.0064% -0.0353% -0.0072% -0.0133% -0.2140% -0.0326%
DVA 0.0000% 0.0707% 0.1124% 0.0017% 0.0144% 0.0150%
BBVA vs Santander No Vol Vol EE Vol No Vol Vol EE Vol
CVA -0.0243% -0.0465% -0.0175% -0.0011% -0.0335% -0.0033%
DVA 0.0000% 0.0261% 0.0539% 0.0406% 0.0825% 0.1233%
Table 12: Contingent CVA for CDS. Copula correlation equal to spread correlation
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2009 2013
iTraxx vs BBVA No Vol Vol EE Vol No Vol Vol EE Vol
CVA -0.0056% -0.0595% -0.0134% -0.0133% -0.2751% -0.0597%
DVA 0.0008% 0.0953% 0.1572% 0.0183% 0.1474% 0.3121%
iTraxx vs Santander No Vol Vol EE Vol No Vol Vol EE Vol
CVA -0.0113% -0.0633% -0.0149% -0.0146% -0.2671% -0.0446%
DVA 0.0000% 0.0892% 0.1499% 0.0171% 0.1478% 0.3026%
BBVA vs Santander No Vol Vol EE Vol No Vol Vol EE Vol
CVA -0.0381% -0.0700% -0.0296% -0.0018% -0.0789% -0.0148%
DVA 0.0000% 0.0374% 0.0892% 0.0621% 0.1546% 0.3118%
Table 13: Non Contingent CVA for CDS
8 Conclusions
We have analyzed the effects of the financial crisis in counterparty credit risk valuation adjust-
ments. Following the arbitrage-free valuation framework presented in [Brigoetal09], we consid-
ered a model with stochastic Gaussian interest rates and CIR++ default intensities. Departing
from previous literature, we have been able to calibrate default intensities profiting from Gaus-
sian mapping techniques presented in [BrigoAlfonsi04], and reproduce the historically observed
instantaneous covariances of CDS prices. To test the calibration procedure, we tracked the Span-
ish financial sector, who has behaved in a singular manner through the crisis, regarded among the
safest in Europe at the beginning, and in need of a partial bailout few years later. We calculated
adjustments involving the two major Spanish banks and a generic European counterpart before
and along the Spanish recession in a plain vanilla interest rate swap and a Credit Default Swap
(CDS).
Our results confirm credit valuation adjustments to be quite sensitive to dynamics parameters
such as volatilities and correlations, in line with existing literature. The impact of the parameters
is both relevant and financially logical, especially for credit derivatives.
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A Swaption prices under G2++
We recall that we had described the short-interest rate as the sum of two Gaussian processes:
r(t) = x(t) + z(t) + ϕ(t, α)
where
{
dx(t) = −ax(t)dt+ σdW1(t), x(0) = 0
dz(t) = −bz(t)dt+ ηdW2(t), z(0) = 0
and (W1,W2) is a two-dimensional Brownian motion under the risk-neutral measure with
instantaneous correlation ρ12.
Consider a European swaption with strike rate SK and maturity T, which gives the holder the
right to enter at time t0 = T an interest rate swap with payment times T = {t1, ..., tn}, t1 > T ,
where he pays (receives) at the fixed rate SK and receives (pays) LIBOR set in arrears. We denote
by τi the year fraction from ti−1 to ti, i = 1, ..., n and set ci = SKτi for i = 1, ..., n − 1 and
cn = 1 + SKτn. Then, as shown in [BrigoMercurio], the arbitrage-free price at time t = 0 of a
European swaption under G2++ can be numerically computed as:
ESG2++(0, T, T , SK , ω;α) =
ωP (0, T )
∫ +∞
−∞
e
− 12
(
x−µx
σx
)2
σx
√
2pi
[
Φ(−ωh1(x))−
n∑
i=1
λi(x)e−κi(x)Φ(−ωh2(x))
]
dx
where ω = 1 (ω = −1) for a payer (receiver) swaption, P (0, T ) is the discount factor between
0 and T , and
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h1(x) = z−µz
σz
√
1−ρ2xz
− ρxz(x−µx)
σx
√
1−ρ2xz
h2(x) = h1(x) +B(b, T, ti)σz
√
1− ρ2xz
λi(x) = ciA(T, ti)e−B(a,T,ti)x
κi(x) = −B(b, T, ti)
[
µz − 12(1− ρ2xz)σ2zB(b, T, ti) + ρxzσz x−µzσx
]
A(t, T ) = P (0,T )P (0,t) exp
(
1
2 [V (t, T )− V (0, T ) + V (0, t)]
)
B(s, t, T ) = 1−e
−s(T−t)
s
and
V (t, T ) = σ
2
a2
(
T − t+ 2ae−a(T−t) − 12ae−2a(T−t) − 32a
)
+η
2
b2
(
T − t+ 2be−b(T−t) − 12be−2b(T−t) − 32b
)
+2ρ12 σηab
(
T − t+ e−a(T−t)−1a + e
−b(T−t)−1
b − e
−(a+b)(T−t)−1
a+b
)
z = z(x) is the unique solution of the following equation:
n∑
i=1
ciA(T, ti)e−B(a,T,ti)x−B(b,T,ti)z = 1
and
µx = −MTx (0, T )
µz = −MTz (0, T )
σx = σ
√
B(2a, 0, T )
σz = η
√
B(2b, 0, T )
ρxz = ρ12σησxσz B(a+ b, 0, T )
where
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MTx (s, t) =
(
σ2
a2
+ ρσηab
)[
1− e−a(t−s)
]
− σ2
2a2
[
e−a(T−t) − e−a(T+t−2s)
]
− ρσηb(a+b)
[
e−b(T−t) − e−bT−at+(a+b)s
]
MTz (s, t) =
(
η2
b2
+ ρσηab
)[
1− e−b(t−s)
]
− η2
2b2
[
e−b(T−t) − e−b(T+t−2s)
]
− ρσηa(a+b)
[
e−a(T−t) − e−aT−bt+(a+b)s
]
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B CDS Pricing under CIR++ stochastic intensity and G2++ interest
rates
B.1 Introduction
We recall our modeling framework. Interest rates under the risk-neutral measure are described by:
r(t) = x(t) + z(t) + ϕ(t, α)
where processes x and z are Ft adapted and satisfy
{
dx(t) = −ax(t)dt+ σdW1(t), x(0) = 0
dz(t) = −bz(t)dt+ ηdW2(t), z(0) = 0
where (W1,W2) is a two-dimensional Brownian motion with instantaneous correlation ρ12.
For the stochastic intensity model we set
λt = yt + ψ(t, β)
y is assumed to be a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process under the risk-neutral measure:
dyt = κ(µ− yt)dt+ ν√ytdW3(t)
where W3 is a standard Brownian motion process such that:
dWjdW3 = ρj3dt, j ∈ {1, 2}
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CDS prices could be computed as:
CDS(t, T , T, S, LGD) = 1{τ>t}E
[
D(t, τ)(τ − Tβ(t)−1)1{τ<Tn}S
+
n∑
i=β(t)
D(t, Ti)αi1{τ>Ti}S − 1{τ<T}D(t, τ)LGD
∣∣∣Gt]
where E is the risk-neutral expectation, Gt is the filtration modeling the flow of information
of the whole market, including credit, and Ft is a complete sub-filtration representing all the
observable market quantities but the default events.
As shown in [BrigoMercurio], filtration switching techniques between Gt and Ft lead to a
general formula for the price of a CDS:
CDS(t, T , T, S, LGD) = S ∫ Tt E[ exp(− ∫ ut (rs + λs)ds)λu](u− Tβ(u)−1)du
+S
n∑
i=1
αiE
[
exp
(
− ∫ Tit (rs + λs)ds)]
−LGD ∫ Tt E[ exp(− ∫ ut (rs + λs)ds)λu]du
Let us call
H1(u) = E
[
exp
(
−
∫ u
t
(rs + λs)ds
)
λu
]
H2(u) = E
[
exp
(
−
∫ u
t
(rs + λs)ds
)]
In general, Hi(u), i = 1, 2 admit no closed form, and hence one is forced to solve
CDS(t, T , T, S, LGD) = 0
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numerically to compute prices of CDS and use them to calibrate the model, which can be a
rather dramatic task. Instead, we will use the Gaussian mapping technique shown in [BrigoAlfonsi04]
to approximate those expectations with a closed form solution.
B.2 Gaussian mapping
We recall that r(t) = x(t) + z(t) + ϕ(t, α), and λt = yt + ψ(t, β). In this setup,
H1(u) = e−
∫ u
t (ϕ(s,α)+ψ(s,β))ds
(
ψ(u, β)E
[
exp
(
− ∫ ut (x(s) + z(s) + y(s))ds)]
+E
[
y(u) exp
(
− ∫ ut (x(s) + z(s) + y(s))ds)])
H2(u) = e−
∫ u
t (ϕ(s,α)+ψ(s,β))dsE
[
exp
(
− ∫ ut (x(s) + z(s) + y(s))ds)]
Denoting by
Ĥ1(u) = E
[
y(u) exp
(
−
∫ u
t
(x(s) + z(s) + y(s))ds
)]
Ĥ2(u) = E
[
exp
(
−
∫ u
t
(x(s) + z(s) + y(s))ds
)]
we have that
H1(u) = e−
∫ u
t (ϕ(s,α)+ψ(s,β))ds
(
ψ(u, β)Ĥ2(u) + Ĥ1(u)
)
H2(u) = e−
∫ u
t (ϕ(s,α)+ψ(s,β))dsĤ2(u)
These expectations have no closed formula when ρi3 6= 0 and CIR processes are involved. The
idea in [BrigoAlfonsi04] is to ”map” CIR dynamics in an analogous tractable Gaussian one that
preserves as much as possible the original CIR structure, and then do the calculations in a fully
Gaussian setup. In their case, both interest rates and intensities are described by a CIR++, and still
they show that converting their dynamics into equivalent Gaussian ones does not affect the pricing
of a CDS. In our case, only intensities are to be converted, so the validity of their result is even
more justified.
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Let us consider a Vasicek process given by
dyVt = κ(µ− yVt )dt+ νV dW3(t)
νV , the volatility of the Vasicek process, is computed by matching bond prices obtained with
y (a CIR process) and yV (Vasicek). That is, we solve the equation:
E
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
ysds
)]
= E
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
yVs ds
)]
Expectations on both sides are analytically known. If we name PCIR(t, T ;β) the price of
a zero-coupon bond under CIR, then, using the formula for the right-hand side shown in, for
example, [BrigoMercurio], we have that the former equation reads:
PCIR(t, T ;β) = exp
[(
µ− (ν
V )2
2κ2
)
[g(κ, T − t)− T + t]− (ν
V )2
4κ
g(κ, T − t)2 − g(κ, T − t)yVt
]
where g(a, s) = (1− e−as)/a. Using that g(a, s)2 = (2/a)(g(a, s)− g(2a, s)), we can solve
for νV :
νV = k
√
2
log(PCIR(t, T ;β)) + µ(T − t)− (µ− yVt )g(κ, T − t)
(T − t)− 2g(κ, T − t) + g(2κ, T − t)
Next, following [BrigoAlfonsi04], we take the following approximations:
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Ĥ2(u) ≈ E
[
exp
(
−
∫ u
t
(x(s) + z(s) + yV (s))ds
)]
Ĥ1(u) ≈ E
[
yV (u) exp
(
−
∫ u
t
(x(s) + z(s) + yV (s))ds
)]
+ ∆
where
∆ = E
[
exp
(
− ∫ ut (x(s) + z(s))ds)](E[y(u) exp(− ∫ ut y(s)ds)]
−E
[
yV (u) exp
(
− ∫ ut yV (s)ds)])
= E
[
exp
(
− ∫ ut (x(s) + z(s))ds)][(− ∂PCIR∂u (t, u;β))
−E
[
yV (u) exp
(
− ∫ ut yV (s)ds)]]
where in the last equality we have differentiated under the expectation sign as in [Mamon].
B.3 Computing expectations
We need to compute four expectations based on three correlated Vasicek processes:
E1(u) = E
[
yV (u) exp
(
− ∫ ut (x(s) + z(s) + yV (s))ds)]
E2(u) = E
[
exp
(
− ∫ ut (x(s) + z(s) + yV (s))ds)]
E3(u) = E
[
yV (u) exp
(
− ∫ ut yV (s)ds)]]
E4(u) = E
[
exp
(
− ∫ ut (x(s) + z(s))ds)]
Following the same procedure as in [BrigoAlfonsi04], we first state the following lemma:
Lemma B.1. Let xt, zt and yVt be three Vasicek processes defined as follows:
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
dxt = −axtdt+ σdW1(t)
dzt = −bztdt+ ηdW2(t)
dyVt = κ(µ− yVt )dt+ νV dW3(t)
with dW1(t)dW2(t) = ρ12dt, dWi(t)dW3(t) = ρi3dt, i = 1, 2. Then, A =
∫ T
t (xs + zs +
yVs )ds and B = y
V
T are Gaussian random variables with respective means:
mA = g(a, T − t)xt + g(b, T − t)zt + g(κ, T − t)yVt + µ
[
(T − t)− g(κ, T − t)
]
mB = µ− (µ− yVt )e( − κ(T − t))
respective variances:
σ2A =
(
σ
a
)2[
(T − t)− 2g(a, T − t) + g(2a, T − t)
]
+
(
η
b
)2[
(T − t)− 2g(b, T − t) + g(2b, T − t)
]
+
(
νV
κ
)2[
(T − t)− 2g(κ, T − t) + g(2κ, T − t)
]
+2ρ12σηab
[
(T − t)− g(a, T − t)− g(b, T − t) + g(a+ b, T − t)
]
+2ρ13σν
V
aκ
[
(T − t)− g(a, T − t)− g(κ, T − t) + g(a+ κ, T − t)
]
+2ρ23ην
V
bκ
[
(T − t)− g(b, T − t)− g(κ, T − t) + g(b+ κ, T − t)
]
σ2B = (ν
V )2g(2κ, T − t)
and correlation
ρ¯ = 1σAσB
[
νV σρ13
a
(
g(κ, T − t)− g(κ+ a, T − t)
)
+ ν
V ηρ23
b
(
g(κ, T − t)− g(κ+ b, T − t)
)
+
(νV )2
κ
(
g(κ, T − t)− g(2κ, T − t)
)]
Proof. Let us define y¯t = yVt e
κt. Using Ito’s lemma, we have that:
dy¯t = κµeκtdt+ νV eκtdW3(t)
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Integrating from t to a given s > t to reach y¯s and substituting back for yVs yields:
yVs = y
V
t e
−κ(s−t) + µ
(
1− e−κ(s−t)
)
+ νV
∫ s
t
e−κ(s−u)dW3(u)
Similar calculations can be made for xt and zt, also Vasicek processes, and we can calculate
mA as:
mA = E
[ ∫ T
t (xs + zs + y
V
s )ds
]
=∫ T
t
[
xte
−a(s−t) + zte−b(s−t) + yVt e−κ(s−t) + µ
(
1− e−κ(s−t)
)]
ds =
g(a, T − t)xt + g(b, T − t)zt + g(κ, T − t)yVt + µ
[
(T − t)− g(κ, T − t)
]
mB and σ2B are as defined in [BrigoAlfonsi04]. To compute σ
2
A we first calculate the variance
of
∫ T
t y
V
s ds:
V ar
[ ∫ T
t y
V
u du
]
= V ar
[
νV
∫ T
t
∫ u
t e
−κ(u−s)dW3(s)du
]
=
V ar
[
νV
∫ T
s=t
( ∫ T
s e
−κ(u−s)du
)
dW3(s)
]
=(
νV
κ
)2
V ar
[ ∫ T
t
(
1− e−κ(T−s)
)
dW3(s)
]
=(
νV
κ
)2 ∫ T
t
(
1− e−κ(T−s)
)2
ds =(
νV
κ
)2[
(T − t)− 2g(κ, T − t) + g(2κ, T − t)
]
Similar arrangements for covariances among processes yield σ2A. We illustrate one of them by
calculating the covariance between A and B.
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Cov(A,B) = Cov
[
νV
∫ T
t e
−κ(T−u)dW3(u),
∫ T
t σ
∫ u
t e
−a(u−s)dW1(s)+
η
∫ u
t e
−b(u−s)dW2(s) + νV
∫ u
t e
−κ(u−s)dW3(s)du
]
=
νV σρ13
a
∫ T
t e
−κ(T−u)
(
1− e−a(T−u)
)
du+ ν
V ηρ23
b
∫ T
t e
−κ(T−u)
(
1− e−b(T−u)
)
du+
(νV )2
κ
∫ T
t e
−κ(T−u)
(
1− e−κ(T−u)
)
du =
νV σρ13
a
[
g(κ, T − t)− g(κ+ a, T − t)
]
+ ν
V ηρ23
b
[
g(κ, T − t)− g(κ+ b, T − t)
]
+
(νV )2
κ
[
g(κ, T − t)− g(2κ, T − t)
]
Dividing Cov(A,B) between σAσB yields ρ¯.
We can compute expectations E1, E2, E3 and E4 by using our lemma jointly with Lemma 3.1
from [BrigoAlfonsi04]:
E1(T ) = mB exp
[
−mA + 12σ2A
]
− ρ¯σAσB exp
[
−mA + 1−ρ¯22 σ2A
]
E2(T ) = exp
[
−mA + 12σ2A
]
E3(T ) = mB exp
[
−mdeg,3A + 12(σdeg,3A )2
]
− ρ¯deg,3σdeg,3A σB exp
[
−mdeg,3A + 1−(ρ¯
deg,3)2
2 (σ
deg,3
A )
2
]
E4(T ) = exp
[
−mdeg,4A + 12
(
σdeg,4A
)2]
where we have taken a degenerate case of xt and zt to apply the former lemma to compute E3,
that is,
mdeg,3A = g(κ, T − t)yVt + µ
[
(T − t)− g(κ, T − t)
]
(σdeg,3A )
2 =
(
νV
κ
)2[
(T − t)− 2g(κ, T − t) + g(2κ, T − t)
]
ρ¯deg,3 = 1
σdegA σB
[
(νV )2
κ
(
g(κ, T − t)− g(2κ, T − t)
)]
and another degenerate case of yVt to apply the former lemma to compute E4, that is,
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mdeg,4A = g(a, T − t)xt + g(b, T − t)zt
(σdeg,4A )
2 =
(
σ
a
)2[
(T − t)− 2g(a, T − t) + g(2a, T − t)
]
+
(
η
b
)2[
(T − t)− 2g(b, T − t) + g(2b, T − t)
]
+2ρ12σηab
[
(T − t)− g(a, T − t)− g(b, T − t) + g(a+ b, T − t)
]
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C Credit calibration results
BBVA Santander iTraxx
3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
3Y 0.049% 93.455% 93.247% 92.810% 84.450% 92.378% 90.448% 88.689% 78.031% 80.918% 80.886% 81.200%
5Y 0.054% 97.874% 97.267% 87.403% 95.495% 93.598% 91.634% 78.850% 83.129% 82.967% 83.438%
7Y 0.053% 98.065% 86.074% 94.620% 93.817% 92.280% 78.193% 82.415% 82.730% 83.149%
10Y 0.054% 85.516% 93.814% 93.188% 91.899% 77.849% 81.742% 81.855% 82.276%
3Y 0.050% 89.280% 88.066% 86.076% 72.003% 73.867% 72.723% 73.290%
5Y 0.054% 97.897% 96.029% 80.132% 83.765% 83.379% 83.645%
7Y 0.054% 98.107% 79.742% 83.303% 83.076% 83.202%
10Y 0.054% 78.614% 82.046% 81.818% 82.084%
3Y 0.042% 98.101% 96.824% 96.071%
5Y 0.045% 99.629% 99.290%
7Y 0.045% 99.799%
10Y 0.043%
Table 14: Historical correlation matrix (standard deviations in diagonal). 2007-2009
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BBVA Santander iTraxx
3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
3Y 0.054% 99.999% 99.999% 99.999% 91.172% 91.158% 91.155% 91.143% 81.359% 81.365% 81.370% 81.374%
5Y 0.052% 99.999% 99.999% 91.172% 91.158% 91.155% 91.143% 81.359% 81.365% 81.370% 81.375%
7Y 0.051% 99.999% 91.175% 91.161% 91.158% 91.146% 81.362% 81.369% 81.373% 81.378%
10Y 0.049% 91.173% 91.159% 91.156% 91.144% 81.360% 81.366% 81.371% 81.376%
3Y 0.054% 99.991% 99.988% 99.977% 78.786% 78.754% 78.727% 78.693%
5Y 0.053% 99.997% 99.987% 78.804% 78.772% 78.744% 78.711%
7Y 0.052% 99.990% 78.807% 78.775% 78.747% 78.714%
10Y 0.051% 78.820% 78.788% 78.760% 78.727%
3Y 0.046% 99.999% 99.998% 99.996%
5Y 0.044% 99.999% 99.998%
7Y 0.043% 99.999%
10Y 0.041%
Table 15: Parametric correlation matrix (standard deviations in diagonal). 2007-2009
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BBVA Santander iTraxx
3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
3Y 0.121% 98.790% 98.291% 97.747% 96.073% 96.566% 96.213% 95.601% 84.470% 84.466% 84.114% 83.680%
5Y 0.121% 99.750% 99.292% 96.053% 97.642% 97.434% 96.875% 84.536% 84.767% 84.479% 84.118%
7Y 0.122% 99.824% 95.633% 97.315% 97.197% 96.704% 84.205% 84.464% 84.213% 83.870%
10Y 0.122% 95.075% 96.830% 96.770% 96.364% 83.564% 83.843% 83.645% 83.320%
3Y 0.117% 98.229% 97.506% 96.626% 84.709% 84.646% 84.188% 83.781%
5Y 0.117% 99.718% 99.102% 84.915% 85.085% 84.736% 84.364%
7Y 0.118% 99.689% 84.305% 84.503% 84.189% 83.821%
10Y 0.119% 83.615% 83.836% 83.541% 83.184%
3Y 0.039% 99.867% 99.517% 99.225%
5Y 0.039% 99.771% 99.547%
7Y 0.037% 99.926%
10Y 0.036%
Table 16: Historical correlation matrix (standard deviations in diagonal). 2011-2013
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BBVA Santander iTraxx
3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
3Y 0.129% 99.999% 99.999% 99.999% 90.992% 91.009% 91.045% 91.124% 82.439% 82.486% 82.522% 82.542%
5Y 0.122% 99.999% 99.999% 91.016% 91.033% 91.070% 91.149% 82.440% 82.487% 82.524% 82.544%
7Y 0.117% 99.999% 91.026% 91.042% 91.079% 91.159% 82.440% 82.488% 82.525% 82.545%
10Y 0.109% 91.037% 91.055% 91.091% 91.171% 82.439% 82.488% 82.526% 82.547%
3Y 0.137% 99.999% 99.999% 99.999% 87.150% 87.240% 87.310% 87.350%
5Y 0.121% 99.999% 99.999% 87.105% 87.195% 87.266% 87.306%
7Y 0.109% 99.999% 87.056% 87.147% 87.218% 87.259%
10Y 0.095% 86.961% 87.052% 87.124% 87.165%
3Y 0.042% 99.999% 99.996% 99.992%
5Y 0.041% 99.999% 99.997%
7Y 0.039% 99.999%
10Y 0.037%
Table 17: Parametric correlation matrix (standard deviations in diagonal). 2011-2013
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